The relationship between ‘law’ and ‘religion’ in liberal democracies has been subjected to a debate in society and among academicians. As to the latter group, political theoreticians and legal philosophers have contributed to this debate over the past few years. The main aim of their contribution has been the introduction of a conceptual framework that theorises the relationship between secular laws that should remain ‘neutral’ towards all citizens and, religion, which in this context stands for the entire body of human beliefs. The attention for this relationship can, among other things be understood against the backdrop of manifestations that are considered contrary to legal and social norms of liberal democracies. For example, last year French politicians proposed a total ban on the Islamic veil in universities, relying on the principles of French secularism. In order to prevent radicalism, Austrian parliament passed ‘Islam bill’ that prohibits Muslim organisations from receiving foreign funding. Many other examples can be mentioned, such as the Swiss referendum on minarets, and proposed or actual bans in various countries regarding ritual slaughter, male circumcision, and different types of religious dress codes. Hence, the question is: what do current societal and theoretical debates tell us about the way liberal democracies interpret, value, protect and thus deal with religious freedom? Leading theories in legal philosophy and political theory indicate three positions that theorise the relationship between law and religion: rejection (though giving some room for toleration on practical grounds), substitution (replacement of religious freedom by other freedoms) and proxy (upheld religion in law as it can stand for different values). These positions are illustrated and criticised based on the European debate on ritual male circumcision. Next, these approaches are integrated into one main concept based on their common characteristic: abstraction from the religious dimension.
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